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The purpose of this article is to analyse the present arrangements for
financing devolved government in Spain and, specifically, to explain why
there is such great asymmetry between the tax powers of the historic or foral
autonomous communities (ACs) – the Basque Country and Navarra – and
the so-called ‘common system’, which applies to the other ACs. 
This article focuses on the assignment of taxation powers, as this area
has very recently been substantially reformed and is bound to become one
of the main issues in future relations between the central state (hereafter the
‘State’) and ACs. Although differences between the common and foral tax
systems prevail, the 1997 and 2002 reforms of the common financing
system have led to some convergence. Greater convergence has been
identified by some commentators as a means of increasing the transparency
and fiscal responsibility of the whole financing system, and making a
distinction between the legitimate exercise of taxation powers and tax
competition among ACs, which is prohibited by the Spanish Constitution
(Ramallo, 1995: 13–14).
THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFYING SPANISH DECENTRALIZATION
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 deliberately omits any reference to the
form of the State. That is, it does not describe it as centralized, federal or
regional. After almost 40 years of Franco’s highly centralized government,
consensus on this matter was anything but easy to obtain. The closest
precedent for decentralization in Spain was established by the Constitution
of 1931 – the Second Spanish Republic – and lasted only eight years
(1931–39). This model was intentionally not followed; its tragic ending in
the Civil War did not make this advisable. For over a century before the
Republic, Spain had been a centralized state, with unresolved regionalist
demands (López Guerra, 1996: 145ff; Moreno, 1999: 150ff). 
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The framers of the 1978 Constitution had before them one of the most
difficult tasks that Spanish politicians could ever come across: to resolve the
‘regional question’ for good. This challenge was met by not defining the
new system, but by establishing a procedural framework instead. Thus,
what the Constitution does is to establish an ‘optional autonomy system’
(the so-called ‘principio dispositivo’) (De Otto y Pardo, 1995: 256). Certain
groups of provinces, provided that they have common historical, cultural
and economic characteristics, have the right to decide whether they want to
become an AC (section 143 of the Constitution). If they decide to do so,
they then have to choose which matters they want to be in charge of. In
other words, this is autonomy ‘à la carte’ or a ‘cheese platter’ system
(López Guerra, 1998: 258).
The Constitution does not actually assign explicit authority to ACs, but
affords them the possibility of taking authority over a group of matters listed
in the Constitution (Sections 148 and 149). It does, however, reserve special
functions for the State. Thus, for example, the State is in charge of
‘regulating the basic conditions to ensure the equality of all Spaniards in the
exercise of their rights and the fulfilment of their obligations’ (Section
149.1.1a), and is assigned exclusive authority for ‘coordination of the
economy’ (Section 149.1.13a).
Despite the existence of two lists of areas of authority in the Constitution
– those for ACs to choose from, and those for the State to undertake – the
division of authority does not end there, as Section 149.3 establishes a series
of provisions that may change the actual distribution of authority. Thus,
ACs may take on the authority not expressly assigned to the State by the
Constitution and the State may take on the authority not taken on by ACs.
In the case of a conflict over which tier should be assigned a given matter,
the laws enacted by the State will prevail over the ACs. Lastly, Section
149.3 establishes that the laws of the State will at any rate be supplementary
to those of the ACs (e.g. in the case of legal gaps or loopholes, or where an
AC’s regulation is incomplete or unclear). This last provision has been the
object of much controversy, as the Constitutional Court in Opinions
118/1996 and 61/1997 radically changed its interpretation to avoid the use
of the provision as an indirect means for the State to retrieve authority from
ACs (García de Enterría and Fernández, 1999: 345ff; Ruiz Almendral,
2002b).
The Constitution allows the State to control ACs in some cases (eg
Sections 150.3, 153 and 155). In practice, these provisions have never been
invoked. Instead, the numerous conflicts have been solved – or are in the
process of being solved – through politically negotiated agreements.
One relevant feature of the constitutional design of the State is the strong
role that the State is bound to play in the distribution of authority. This can
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be explained by the coexistence of the principle of autonomy and the
principle of unity. They are both expressed in Section 2: ‘The Constitution
is grounded on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation … and
guarantees and recognizes the right to autonomy of its regions.’ This
apparent oxymoron has been the subject of many decisions of the
Constitutional Court (inter alia, in Opinions 4/1981; 25/1981; and
37/1981), which has repeatedly stated that it is within the unity of the State
that autonomy can be realized (López Guerra, 1993 and 1996).
This process has given rise to a form of state that is not easily definable.
The ‘politically correct’ term by which Spain is usually defined is that of
‘State of Autonomies’ (Estado de las autonomías). But if one considers the
broad scope of decentralization in Spain and the authority gained by the
ACs over the past 20 years, one has to conclude that – and this has become
quite a controversial issue – Spain is, in practice if not in legal form, a
federal state.1 
THE ASYMMETRIC MODEL AND THE NEED FOR BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Probably the most striking feature of the Spanish devolution process is the
speed at which it has developed. Between 1978 and 1983, all the Spanish
regions engaged in this process, so that the whole country is presently
divided into 17 ACs. The evolution of public expenditure clearly shows the
speed of the devolution process. Table 1 shows that, in 1978, the State was
in charge of 89.0 per cent of public expenditure; only 23 later, this had
dropped to 51.0 per cent, with ACs in charge of 32.5 per cent. Another
important feature of this model of the State is its asymmetry. This
asymmetry is both de facto and de jure (Watts, 1999: 28ff; Agranoff, 1999:
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TABLE 1
THE DECENTRALIZATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE (% SHARE OF TOTAL
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE)
Year State Autonomous Communities Municipalities
1978 89.0 - 11.0
1984 72.6 14.4 13.0
1987 66.7 18.7 14.6
1990 59.6 23.9 16.5
1992 57.0 26.6 16.4
1998 51.0 32.5 16.5
Source: Monasterio Escudero and Suárez Pandiello, 1998: 79. This table presumes that all ACs
have the same set of functions from 1998, which is exactly the situation as of 1 January
2002. More detailed data are available at http://www.estadief.minhac.es/ (the official web
site of the Ministry of Finance).
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96ff; Moreno, 1999: 151ff) and explains the key role played by political
agreements.
There are two principal reasons why the State of Autonomies is
asymmetrical. The first lies in the procedural framework established by the
Constitution. It provides two special procedures for ACs to be formed. They
differ in that one allows for fuller and faster autonomy, while the other
entails a more limited and gradual attainment of autonomous powers. These
are usually referred to as the ‘fast-lane’ and ‘slow-lane’ processes. Fast-lane
ACs may initially take on more authority, including health and education,
which together represent about 80 per cent of total policy competence that
can be taken on by ACs (see Table 2). Eventually, slow-laners may increase
their authority and gain access to the maximum level, provided that they
follow the process established in Section 148.2.2
The original idea of the framers of the Constitution was that some ACs
with past experience of self-government should be given the opportunity to
become fast-laners from the beginning, while the rest would have to start by
being slow-laners. Hence the second transitional provision of the
Constitution, which establishes fast access to autonomy for those ACs
which had approved self-government statutes in the past (i.e. during the
Second Republic). These were to be Catalonia, the Basque Country and
Galicia, which had not only had brief access to autonomy in the years of the
Republic but also had more or less in common a strong nationalist sentiment
fuelled by the existence of different languages. In the end, however, seven
ACs became fast-laners: in addition to the aforementioned three: Andalusia,
Navarra, Valencia and the Canary Islands adopted the higher level of
autonomy. The other ten ACs remained with a lower level of autonomy until
2002, when they ‘caught up’ with the fast-laners.
The second explanation for asymmetry lies in the recognition of the
historic rights of some regions, enshrined in the first additional provision of
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TABLE 2
DIFFERENT QUANTITATIVE WEIGHT OF SLOW- AND FAST-LANE
COMPETENCIES
Areas of authority % of the total
Slow-lane matters 18.18
Education 38.61
Health 43.21
Source: Monasterio Escudero and Suárez Pandiello, 1998: 59. This table reflects the average cost
of this authority taking into consideration both what it used to cost the State before it was
transferred and what it actually costs the ACs once it is transferred. Needless to say, the
cost will greatly differ depending on the AC (e.g. some ACs, such as Extremadura, are
known for having a significant percentage of retired population)
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the Spanish Constitution. This has resulted in the Basque Country and
Navarra having a much greater level of competences, especially in fiscal
matters. 
The first type of asymmetry can be categorized as de facto or transitorial;
it refers only to the initial process, but does not prevent all ACs from
eventually gaining access to the same level of authority. The second type is
a de jure asymmetry, of a much more controversial nature.
This explains why bilateral and multilateral agreements have played a very
important role in the assignment of authority. Bilateral agreements have
been necessary to address the different autonomy aspirations of ACs.
Moreover, in the case of the Basque Country and Navarra, bilateral
agreements were the only possible way to address the special status that
they, as ‘historic communities’, were granted by the 1978 Constitution.
Multilateral agreements have coexisted with bilateral agreements and have
served to greatly unify the policy competences of the ACs (López Guerra,
1993: 32–5; Agranoff, 1999: 107–12). The role of political agreements has
also been very relevant in the process of allocation of resources between the
different tiers of government. This is quite a politicized issue in Spain that
has been the cause of much tension between the State and some ACs
(especially Catalonia and the Basque Country).
This system of bilateral and multilateral agreements serves to give
weight to the ACs’ opinions in the allocation of resources. Such agreements
are an essential part of cooperative federalism (Wiltshire, 1980: 355ff).
However, it has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency, as those
agreements take place behind closed doors and the results are only partially
made public. This is the so-called ‘executive federalism’ that may give rise
to a deficit of democracy (Wiltshire, 1980: 369; Ramallo Massanet and
Zornoza Pérez, 2000). It has often been argued that most of this political
discussion should take place in the Senate, which, at least in theory if not in
practice, is the representative chamber of the ACs (García Morillo, Pérez
Tremps and Zornoza Pérez, 1998).
Another frequent criticism of the agreements is that they have modified
the rules for the allocation of resources established in the Constitution and
in the laws to benefit those ACs in a better position to negotiate. These
criticisms mainly arose after Convergència i Uniò (CiU), the Catalan
nationalist party, helped each of the two main national political parties, the
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and the Partido Popular (PP),
build a sufficient majority to govern in 1993–96 and 1996–20003
respectively. In exchange, the CiU sought, and obtained, a revision of the
common financing system.4 However, as the subsequent reforms in the
system applied to all ACs, not only Catalonia, this second criticism 
seems unfounded.
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THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTIN THE DEVOLVED
FINANCING SYSTEM
The rulings of the Constitutional Court have played a significant role in the
definition of authority in the State of Autonomies. Taking into account that
the vast majority of the matters listed in the Constitution are actually shared
between the State and the ACs, it is not hard to imagine that this has been a
source of permanent conflict between these two tiers of government. The
court, as the only body competent to resolve such conflicts, has undertaken
a very important task in the evolution of the State of Autonomies (López
Guerra, 1998).
In taxation matters, there have been some relevant opinions that have
reinforced the ACs’ spending power (13/1992; see Ramallo Massanet,
1993); declared void AC taxes because they were similar to State or
municipal taxes (49/1995, 289/2000); and established the right of ACs to
establish taxes, provided they do so in matters that fall within their scope of
competence (37/1987, 186/1993) (Ortiz Calle, 2001: 28ff).
This role has been reinforced by the ‘unfinished’ nature of the different
provisions regarding regional autonomy established in the Constitution,
and by a certain ‘didactic’ tendency of the court to fully explain and thus
serve to clarify the rules governing the State of Autonomies. Moreover,
the court has often ruled in favour of the ACs, which in the first years of
the decentralized model was almost revolutionary in a country with such
a long tradition of centralization (López Guerra, 1998: 263–4). However,
it is probably time that it played a secondary role in the shaping of the
State of Autonomies, in favour of a stronger role for parliamentary
authorities. At present, ‘it is becoming almost routine in Spain to discuss
any Law of certain importance in two forums, a first debate in the
Parliament, a second, and decisive one, in the Constitutional Court’
(López Guerra, 1998: 263).
ASYMMETRY: THE EXISTENCE OF TWO FINANCING SYSTEMS
One of the main features of the Spanish fiscal decentralization model is the
radical asymmetry that exists between two groups of ACs. On the one hand,
the financing systems applicable to the foral ACs are known as Concierto
(Basque Country) and Convenio (Navarra) systems. Both these terms
translate into English as ‘agreement’. The main characteristic of this kind of
system is that it entails a maximum level of taxation autonomy, which
means these two ACs have powers to pass legislation, with only a few
limitations,5 on the main taxes of the Spanish fiscal system. Because the
State is still responsible for the provision of some public functions or
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services within the territory of these two ACs, it is entitled to receive a
certain sum of money from them, known as the ‘Cupo’ (quota).
In contrast, the so-called ‘common system’, which applies to the rest of
the ACs, is quite the opposite of the Cupo. For reasons to be examined later,
the main difference lies in the fact that, under the common system, the ACs
have very limited taxation powers, which results in a greater financial
dependence upon the State. Hence, most of their revenues are provided by
the State, in the form of transfers.
For the ACs within the Cupo system, the revenues deriving from taxes
represent 94 per cent of expenditure, while transfers from the State
represent less than 1 per cent in the case of the Basque Country, and less
than 3 per cent in the case of Navarra.6 For the common-system ACs,
transfers still represent more than 60 per cent of their revenues. Taxes only
represent about 20 per cent; within this category, ceded taxes, which still
operate, in practice, as a mere transfer of funds as most ACs have exercised
their powers in a very limited way, represent about 90 per cent.7
It is commonplace in the fiscal federalism literature to refer to ‘Vertical
Fiscal Imbalance’, abbreviated as VFI (and also known as ‘fiscal
mismatch’, ‘fiscal gap’ or ‘revenue gap’). This situation arises when one tier
of government – usually the state – has a greater power to obtain revenues
than it actually needs for the exercise of its assigned level of authority, while
the other – usually consisting of sub-national governments – is in the
opposite situation (Oates, 1977: 16; Boadway and Hobson, 1993: 28ff;
Boadway, 2000: 46ff). This creates an imbalance that must be resolved in
order to guarantee to the sub-national governments the autonomy required
for the exercise of their authority. The problem is easily understood and
conflicting parties – the State and sub-national governments – normally
agree that it must be resolved and that the allocation of resources must be
‘re-balanced’. Conflict usually arises when deciding which of the different
possible solutions should be used. 
Briefly, VFI imbalance can be solved either through transfers from the
state or through a reassignment of taxation powers. In practice, a mix of the
two is typically used, so that most sub-national governments receive
financing in the form of both transfers and their own taxes. When sub-
national governments receive financing almost exclusively in the form of
transfers, an incentive is created to spend those monies in a less responsible
way. The idea is simple and similar to the ‘moral hazard’ problem. It is
easier for governments to spend money when (a) they do not shoulder the
political burden of having to raise it (i.e. establishing or raising taxes), and
(b) there is no need for them to explain to voters/taxpayers the relationship
between monies raised and monies spent (Boadway, 2000: 51). In other
words, the situation creates a lack of accountability that may not be
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advisable. This has been, and to a certain extent still is, the situation for
common-system ACs.
Debates about the ACs’ fiscal responsibility have become one of the
main issues in the relationship between the State and the ACs. There is a
certain generalized agreement in that it is fiscal responsibility ‘at the
margin’ (Heald and Geaughan, 1996: 173ff; Boadway, 2001: 112), as
opposed to the exact equivalence of expenditure and own revenues, that is
the objective to be attained. Giving sub-national tiers of government
responsibility to obtain monies in addition to what they obtain in the form
of transfers has been considered fundamental to any decentralization of
powers (Castells Oliveres, 1988: 75; Ramallo Massanet, 1988: 534–5;
Zornoza Pérez, 1996: 20ff; McLure, 2000: 634ff; García-Milá and
McGuire, 2003; Ruiz Almendral 2003a). 
Moreover, the transfer of at least some taxation powers to such sub-
national tiers of government has been considered essential in order to
reinforce a certain level of political autonomy. In this sense, it has been said
that the most essential principle in matters of taxation is the guarantee that
the institutions establishing them have a democratic representation, which
has been traditionally expressed through the maxim ‘No taxation without
representation’. The basic principle in the decentralization of authority in a
multi-level government may be expressed with another maxim: ‘No
representation without taxation’ (Heald et al., 1998: 28ff). 
In Spain, VFI occurs in both the Cupo and the common system. In the
first case, it favours the historic ACs. The opposite happens in the common
system, where most ACs still receive transfers from the State to facilitate
the execution of their competences. Thus, put simply, it is possible to say
that in the Cupo system, ACs finance the State, while in the common system
exactly the opposite occurs. This situation is bound to change in the next
few years, as there have been some legislative reforms whose aim was to
increase the common-system ACs’ fiscal responsibility, and thus decrease
their financial dependence upon the State (Zubiri, 2000a: 77; García-Milá
and McGuire, 2003).
The question is, then, how is it possible to maintain such different
financial systems among sub-national entities within the same country?
As can be easily imagined, the mere existence of such asymmetries has
been, and still is, the cause of much political discussion. The Constitution
recognizes the existence of certain ‘historic rights’. Thus, its first
supplementary provisions state that ‘the Constitution protects and respects
the historical rights of the foral territories’. However, to some authors, this
provision does not permit the existence of totally different financing rules
(Medina Guerrero, 1991: 82ff). It has also been argued that it is not
feasible to maintain such asymmetry in the long term as this will have a
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negative impact on the efficiency of the system, mainly because it would
lead to increasingly divergent tax systems (García-Milá and McGuire,
2003).
Whether or not the Cupo system could be extended to the other ACs has
been the subject of much academic debate. There seems to be a certain
consensus that it would not be economically sustainable, as it would entail
the loss of the most important taxes, and their revenues, by the State
(Castells Oliveres, 2000b; Zubiri, 2000b: 137ff). Some observers have
calculated that if the system were applied to all common-system ACs, all of
them except the two poorest (Andalucía and Extremadura) would gain
(Zubiri: 2000b, 139). Others come to the same conclusion but attribute it not
to greater tax powers, but in certain revenue advantages that lie in the
original calculation of the Cupo and that persist, despite apparent
inaccuracies, for political reasons (García-Milá and McGuire: 2003). 
THE COMMON FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The Allocation of Resources Under the Constitution: The Role of Transfers
and Taxes in the Financing of ACs
The small proportion of own tax revenues in the financing of the common-
system ACs results in a substantial lack of fiscal responsibility. This
situation derives both from the fact that they have limited taxation powers,
and from their insufficient use of the powers that they already have. This
situation is barely consistent with the larger responsibility that the ACs have
in other areas, as has been often pointed out (Rodríguez Bereijo, 1985: 71;
Zornoza Pérez, 1987: 971–2; Castells Oliveres, 1988: 129ff, and 2002: 14ff;
Solé-Vilanova, 1990: 350ff; Ramallo Massanet, 1993; García-Milá and
McGuire, 2003; Ruiz Almendral, 2003a). 
This debate has eventually led to substantial reforms of the ACs’
financing system. The main objective has been to increase the ACs’ powers
to establish taxes, thus changing the present situation where they are still
seen by taxpayers as ‘fairy godmothers’ who offer services to citizens
without asking for monies in exchange (the taxation role of ‘wicked
stepmother’ being played by the State).
In accordance with the recognition of autonomy, or, stated more
accurately, the recognition of the right to be autonomous, the Spanish
Constitution grants ACs ‘financial autonomy for the development and
execution of their authority’. The Constitutional Court has interpreted this
as their right to have sufficient means for carrying out the competences that
fall within their scope of authority, as well as the right to manage those
means without any undue conditions imposed by the State.8
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Apart from stating this principle of financial autonomy, the Constitution
establishes a list of resources that will constitute the ACs’ income. This list
includes almost all kinds of possible existing resources. Thus, they may
obtain revenues from: ceded taxes; surtaxes on existing State taxes; their
own taxes; public debt; and transfers (Section 157.1). Furthermore, the
Constitution clearly recognizes and guarantees taxation powers to the ACs
(Section 133.2). However, they must abide by the rules established by the
State. In Section 157.3, the Constitution allows the State to approve a
special law (ley orgánica) regulating both how these resources will be
distributed among ACs and the limits for the exercise of their financial
power on the resources. This implies that the State is given the power to
both limit and control the financial autonomy of the ACs. This is probably
inconsistent with the recognition of the right to autonomy granted to the
ACs, as has often been pointed out (Zornoza Pérez, 1987: 971–2; Castells
Oliveres, 1988; Ruiz Almendral, 2003a). The State has made use of this
possibility and approved a set of laws that greatly limit the financial
autonomy of the ACs.9
Most relevant is the Special Law for the Financing of the Autonomous
Communities, Law 8/1980 (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las
Comunidades Autónomas – hereafter, the LOFCA). Good examples of these
limits are those established on the creation of new taxes by ACs (discussed
later). Although it is not always clear whether it is the limitations on
establishing new taxes or the unwillingness to withstand the political
consequences of increasing the tax burden that has deterred ACs from
creating new taxes, the existence of such limits underlines the importance
of intergovernmental transfers in Spain. When the level of tax autonomy is
so low, the possibilities for ACs to obtain their own resources are scarce;
hence the need for transfers from the State. This situation also explains the
substantial imbalance between the common-system ACs’ autonomy of
spending – which has been strongly supported by the Constitutional Court
– and their limited power to raise their own revenues.
Therefore, since the beginning of the State of Autonomies, transfers
have played a far more important role than own taxes, which has resulted in
the ACs’ financial dependence on the State. For most of them, transfers still
represent more than half of their revenues. Moreover, if we take into
account that ceded taxes are closer to being a transfer than a tax revenue,
this percentage can amount to as much as 80 per cent of their current
revenues.
The transfers received by the ACs have traditionally been based upon
need. According to the LOFCA, the cost of the devolved powers would be
calculated and a given amount would then be transferred to the ACs. In
reality, the cost was actually never calculated but rather negotiated in
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bilateral commissions (between the State and each AC); these would meet
behind closed doors and agree on a certain amount. The reason for this is
that the existing accounting systems of the State were inadequate for such
calculations, so the actual cost of the transferred services was never actually
determined (Generalidad de Cataluña, 1985: 35ff; Castells Oliveres, 1988:
138ff; Monasterio Escudero and Suárez Pandiello, 1993: 17ff; Zornoza
Pérez, 1987 and 1996). This continuous negotiation was also the subject of
sharp criticism. Apart from the argument that it was undemocratic, from a
financial perspective it was deemed to create inequalities as, eventually,
those ACs whose bargaining position was weaker would get less monies to
exercise the powers that fall within the scope of their authority.
Conditional transfers have a large relative weight in the financing of
ACs. As in many other decentralized states, their mere existence has often
given rise to controversy. According to the Constitutional Court’s rulings,
transfer of monies from the State to the ACs must be unconditional when its
objective is to pay for classes of matters that fall under the authority of the
ACs. Otherwise, according to the Court, the spending power of the State
would intrude, serving indirectly as a way of controlling the ACs’ activities
(Opinion 13/1992). While the case law may state this general principle, in
practice this has been a continuous source of tension between the ACs and
the State. The main claim of the ACs has been that the State puts conditions
on the transfers of monies that go far beyond its authority, thus intruding
into their powers. Examples include the provisions in the State’s budget law
that clearly state which institution/organ of the AC should administer the
monies, in effect predetermining how the money should be spent.10
This financial dependence of ACs was not regarded as a problem in the
early years of devolution. Back then, the ACs were regarded with a certain
distrust by citizens and some of their attempts to establish new taxes were
emphatically rejected by voters.11 As the ACs gained more powers, their
financial needs grew substantially and a greater expansion of the transfer
system was needed. Thus, the fast-lane ACs became the most financially
dependent. Debates about the ACs’ fiscal responsibility became one of the
main issues in the relationship between the State and the ACs. Once the
State of Autonomies had become a reality, the idea that the ACs should have
more say in taxation matters became commonplace.
Limited Powers of ACs to Establish New Taxes
Although the Constitution (Sections 133 and 157) bestows taxation powers
upon the ACs, the LOFCA imposes severe limits on the creation by them of
new taxes. The most important limitation is the prohibition of double
taxation (Sections 6.2 and 6.3), which prevents autonomous taxes from
being similar to taxes created by the State and the municipalities. As these
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had already established taxes on most of the imaginable sources of
revenues, little tax room was left for ACs (Zornoza Pérez, 1987[??] and
1996). The existing tax room was traditionally occupied by the State and the
municipalities, and this did not change when the ACs were established. 
Therefore, despite constitutional provisions that guarantee to ACs the
power to establish taxes and financial autonomy (Section 156.1), the limits
established by the State have led to a system in which taxation powers
remain mostly in its hands. Generally, the establishment of new taxes is not
a very attractive option for ACs. On the one hand, most of the ACs’ taxes
are very costly to administer and do not generate much revenue. On the
other, almost every time an AC establishes a new tax, the State challenges
it before the Constitutional Court.12 Such prohibitions equally affect the
creation of new taxes by the foral ACs. However, because they hold
extensive powers on most of the relevant taxes (the Concierto or Convenio
taxes), they do not need to create new ones. This situation inspired the 1997
and 2002 reforms of the common system. 
The 1997 and 2002 Reforms of Ceded Taxes
The main goal of these reforms was to make ACs more involved in the
establishment of taxes and thus more directly accountable to their taxpayers
for the monies they spend. This has been done through a reassignment of tax
powers, which took place between 1997 and 2002. These reforms consist of
the sharing of some tax room that until then had been occupied solely by the
State. This is done though a type of resource called a ‘ceded tax’. The term
‘ceded’ is not quite accurate, as it was not the tax but rather its yield that
was ceded to the ACs. Thus, until 1997, ceded taxes were State taxes whose
yield was granted to ACs according to the taxes paid within their territory.
Due to powers delegated by the State, ACs had also taken on the
responsibility for administering these taxes. 
Ceded taxes were therefore virtually a kind of transfer, by which some
of the taxes ‘owned’ and entirely regulated by the State accrued to, and were
administered by, the ACs. They differ from transfers in that the ACs may
receive a ‘bonus’ in some cases. Thus, if the actual yield of the tax is greater
than what had been forecast by the State, the AC receives the difference,
though if it is less the AC receives the initially forecast amount. However,
an increase of the yield may or may not be a consequence of a better tax
administration; for example, it may be due to economic conditions.
Therefore, this bonus only partially serves as an incentive for ACs to
administer ceded taxes more efficiently.13 On the other hand, the ACs’
decision-making powers over these kinds of taxes were almost non-existent.
Until 1997, ceded taxes were a type of resource conceptually closer to 
a transfer. 
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In 1997, in order to give the ACs more tax room, a reform was enacted
giving ceded taxes quite a different meaning than they had previously had.
Thus, the power to regulate some aspects of these taxes – mainly tax
brackets, tax rates and some tax credits – was conferred on the ACs. What
until 1997 had been a form of transfer then became a form of tax sharing
(Zornoza Pérez, 1997; Ruiz-Huerta and López Laborda, 1997; Castells
Oliveres, 2000b; Ruiz Almendral, 2003a: 107ff). 
As shown in Table 3, the powers of ACs are not uniform across ceded
taxes. Depending on the tax, the yield will totally or partially accrue to the
ACs, which may or may not take on legislative powers and be in charge of
the administration of the tax. 
The ACs are given the option to choose whether they want to exercise their
regulatory powers. If they fail to do so or decide not to exercise such powers,
the State regulates every aspect in that AC. If an AC decides to pass legislation
modifying the above-mentioned authorized aspects over any ceded tax, it may
do so by enacting legislation which will then substitute for State law in those
areas where the AC can legislate. For instance, in the case of the wealth tax
(where ACs may establish whatever tax rates they choose), State legislation on
tax rates will be applied to residents in those ACs that decide not to establish
their own tax rates. The way that this option has been structured – and the fact
that the State still guarantees to ACs lump-sum grants allocated on the basis of
53THE ASYMMETRIC TAXATION POWERS IN SPAIN
TABLE 3
CEDED TAXES AS AT 1 JANUARY 1997
Ceded tax AC share Administration Legislative powers that ACs 
(%) may assume
Personal income tax 33 State Tax rates (must have same number of tax 
brackets as the State tax)
Tax credits, under certain conditions
Wealth tax 100 ACs Tax rates (must have same number of tax 
brackets as the State tax)
Minimum threshold
Death and gift taxes 100 ACs Deductions (mainly, for family 
circumstances)
Tax rates
Taxes on transfers 
and official documents 100 ACs Tax rates
Gambling taxes 100 ACs Exemptions
Taxable base
Tax rates
Tax credits
Tax administration regulations
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historical shares in State transfers – serves to create a strong disincentive for
ACs to use their new taxation powers. Evidence of this disincentive is the fact
that, since 1997, the ACs have mainly used their powers to create new fiscal
benefits (Ruiz Almendral, 2002a: 473ff; 2003a: 301–434).
In July 2001, the ACs and the State agreed to broaden the scope of these
ceded taxes. As a result, the ACs’ legislative powers for some of these taxes
are now greater and new taxes have been ceded to them. The new powers
over the ceded taxes vary widely, depending on the tax. In some cases, the
ceded tax operates substantially as a transfer (as in the Value Added Tax)
but in others, the broad scope of the powers granted makes the tax very
similar to an autonomous tax (as in the case of gambling taxes). The
position as at 1 January 2002 is shown in Table 4.
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TABLE 4
CEDED TAXES AS AT 1 JANUARY 2002
Ceded taxes AC share Administration Legislative powers that ACs 
(%) may assume
Personal income tax 33 State Tax rates (must have same number 
of tax brackets as the State tax)
Tax credits, under certain conditions
Wealth tax 100 ACs Tax rates
Minimum threshold
Tax credits
Death and gift taxes 100 ACs Deductions (mainly, for family 
circumstances) Tax rates
Deductions and tax credits
Tax administration regulations
Taxes on transfers 
and official documents 100 ACs Tax rates
Tax credits
Tax administration regulations
Gambling taxes 100 ACs Exemptions
Taxable base
Tax rates
Tax credits
Tax administration regulations
Value added tax 35 State None
Excise duties 40 State None
Tax on wine 40 State None
Tax on electricity 100 State None
Tax on vehicles 100 ACs Tax rates (under certain conditions and  
limits)
Special tax on gas 100 ACs Tax rates (under certain conditions and 
limits)
Tax administration regulations
134rfs03.qxd  25/11/03  08:50  Page 54
Pr
oo
f
This reassignment of taxation powers constitutes the most important tax
reform since the State of Autonomies became a reality. Under the new
regime, common-system ACs have substantially increased their taxation
powers. Although the gap between the powers of the foral and common
ACs remains quite large, it has certainly been reduced by the reform. If the
tendency continues, the possibility that the two systems end up converging
should not be completely ruled out. Such convergence derives mainly from
the common-system ACs’ newly acquired taxation powers. Until 1997, only
foral ACs could pass legislation and control the main taxes of the system
(such as personal income or corporation income taxes). Since then,
common-system ACs have gradually gained access to most important tax
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TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF COMMON-SYSTEM AND FORAL ACS
Main taxes Legislative powers that Legislative powers that 
in Spain common-system ACs may assume foral ACs may assume
Personal income tax Total regulation of the tax Tax rates (must have same number of
tax brackets as the State tax)
Tax credits, under certain conditions
Corporation 
income tax Total regulation of the tax None
Tax on income of 
non-residents Regulation of the tax only in the case 
of permanent establishment in 
the foral territory None
Wealth tax Total regulation of the tax Tax rates
Minimum threshold
Tax credits
Death and gift taxes Total regulation of the tax Deductions (mainly, for family 
circumstances) 
Tax rates
Deductions and tax credits
Tax administration regulations
Taxes on transfers and 
official documents Total regulation of the tax Tax rates
Tax credits
Tax administration regulations
Gambling taxes Total regulation of these taxes Exemptions
Taxable base
Tax rates
Tax credits
Tax administration regulations
Value added tax None None
Excise duties None None
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bases, excluding corporation income taxes. Although the gap is still wide,
for common-system ACs can only regulate certain aspects of some of these
taxes while foral ACs may regulate most elements of the said taxes except
for certain aspects, the tendency is a degree of convergence. However,
when we compare the powers that the common-system and foral ACs hold
on the main taxes of the taxation system, it is clear from Table 5 that a
profound asymmetry prevails.
The Role of Transfers: A System Still Largely Based Upon Need
As much as the taxation powers of both financing systems are becoming closer,
the financing rules governing them remain radically different. The financing of
common-system ACs is still largely based upon need. Thus their newly
acquired fiscal capacity on ceded taxes, which represents a considerable
change to the former situation where ACs’ legislative powers on taxes were
clearly residual, is not sufficiently taken into account. The common system
establishes a set of revenue guarantees aimed at covering the potential risk that
the exercise of taxation powers usually entails. Put simply, while revenues in
the foral systems accrue to the ACs on a strictly derivation basis, in the
common system, the State guarantees minimum revenues also on ceded taxes.
The financing system is entirely regulated in a state law14 for all 15
common-system ACs. In brief, the law prescribes that all ACs shall receive
an amount sufficient to finance their authority. This amount, named ‘masa
homogénea’, is formed by ceded taxes and general grants from the State, all
calculated relative to the base year 1999. This way, it is guaranteed that no
AC will receive less than under the previous system. The way these monies
are distributed among the 15 common-system ACs includes a set of
guarantees and adjustments in order to take into account certain
redistributive criteria, such as density of population and relative income.
If an AC decides to increase or decrease the tax burden of its ceded taxes,
this will be reflected in the total budget received from the State, which will
then vary accordingly. However, there is no mechanism to incentivize ACs
to exercise their taxation powers, as they still obtain the revenue of ceded
taxes, even when they do not actually regulate any aspect of them. That is,
the financial incentive for ACs to use their powers over those ceded taxes
they control is weaker than the political incentive not to increase the tax
burden of their citizens because a substantial amount of revenue is already
guaranteed from ceded taxes they do not control. This explains why most of
them have preferred to establish tax credits and tax benefits, as opposed to
increasing the tax burden – that has, so far, only occurred in the cases of
gambling taxes, capital transfers tax and stamp duty.
It would be feasible in Spain, and would constitute a good way to
increase the common-system ACs’ exercise of fiscal responsibility, to adopt
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a formula that took into account their actual fiscal capacity (Ruiz
Almendral: 2003b). That would involve actually measuring their potential
to obtain additional revenues, and taking that into account when designing
the transfer systems. The idea would be to establish a system similar to the
Canadian ‘representative tax system’.
THE CUPO SYSTEMS OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY AND NAVARRA
The functioning of the financial system for the foral ACs is radically
different to that for the common-system ACs. Under the Cupo systems, the
foral ACs run all the risk themselves, and no revenue guarantee is provided
by the State. Presumably, this status is still attractive for these communities,
as they are richer than the Spanish average. Another feasible explanation is
that, as some claim (see above), the Cupo has never been properly
calculated, the result being that these communities (Basque Country and
Navarra) may actually be paying less for the same services than the
(common-system) rest. This continues to be one of the main objects of
tension between the Basque government and the State government. 
Assignment of Taxes
There are two main differences between the Navarra system and the Basque
Country system. First, the Convenio of Navarra is valid for an indefinite
period, while the Concierto of the Basque Country must be renegotiated
every five years15 by the Joint Committee (Comisión mixta) on the
Economic Agreement. This committee is made up of 12 members: one per
provincial council (diputación foral), three from the Basque government,
and six from the State government. So far, since the approval of the Spanish
Constitution, there have been five Cupo laws, in force during the following
periods: 1982–86, 1987–91, 1992–96, 1997–2001 and 2002–06.16 The
second difference is that, unlike any other AC, the Basque AC has
legislative authority over municipalities. This includes the right to establish
and regulate local taxes, within a very flexible framework established by the
State.
The origins of the Basque Concierto can be traced back to the thirteenth
century, though a more direct precedent of the present system is the Law of
21 July 1876. During the Spanish Civil War, the Concierto was suspended
for Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, two of the three provinces that form the Basque
Country. During Franco’s dictatorship, only the third province, Álava, was
allowed to keep the Concierto system. The enactment of the Basque
Country’s Statute of Autonomy in 1979 – known as the Guernica Statute –
restored the Concierto to the whole Basque Country, which was made
effective under the Law 12/1981, 13 May (Medina Guerrero, 1991; Alonso
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Olea, 1995). The Basque Concierto underwent a substantial reform in 1997
(Law 38/1997), which resulted in a certain increase of this AC’s leeway in
the exercise of its taxation powers, as some of the limits for such exercise
were removed.
Navarra’s system dates back to the Law of 16 August 1841. Under the
present Constitution, it is regulated by Special Law 13/1982, 10 August
(Ley de Reintegración y Amejoramiento del Régimen Foral de Navarra)
and by Law 28/1990, 26 December, which contains the details and
calculation of Navarra’s Cupo. Although the description below of the
operation of the Cupo system refers specifically to the Basque Country, that
for Navarra is quite similar.
The Cupo systems entail that the Basque Country and Navarra have the
right to have their own tax systems, which includes most of the powers to
regulate and administer the main taxes that would be held by any treasury.
The agreement includes a set of provisions that aim to guarantee an
adequate level of harmonization – not homogeneity – between these
systems and the State’s. The foral ACs must, inter alia: respect the
solidarity principle enshrined in the Constitution (Sections 2 and 156.2);
establish their tax legislation with regard to the general taxation structure of
the State (which shall therefore not be distorted by the exercise of taxation
powers by the ACs);17 and maintain a general tax burden ‘equivalent’ to the
State’s. This last provision is certainly ambiguous: there is no official
interpretation of what exactly can be considered to be a non-equivalent level
of tax burden (Zubiri, 2000a: 51ff).
In the case of the Basque Country, the authority on taxation matters is
exercised not by the AC itself, but by the governing bodies (known as
Diputaciones forales) of the three foral provinces: Álava, Bizkaia and
Gipuzkoa. Their treasuries regulate, levy and administer all the Basque
Country’s taxes. The Basque Parliament is then in charge of enacting the
pertinent provisions in order to guarantee a certain level of harmonization
among the three bodies (including both their legislative and executive
powers). In this regard, it is important to point to the existence of the Basque
Tax Coordination Agency (Órgano de Coordinación Tributaria de Euskadi
– OCTE), created in 1989 (by Law 3/1989, 30 May). In this agency there
are representatives of the three provincial councils and of the Basque
government. Among other activities, the OCTE publishes the Basque
Treasury’s Integrated Annual Report,18 where all the data concerning the
three treasuries, as well as other information, can be found.
The Concierto or Convenio taxes are all the main taxes of the Spanish
tax system, such as personal and corporation income taxes, the wealth tax,
the death and gift taxes, the capital transfer tax and stamp duty. Those taxes
that are harmonized, in a more or less precise way, by European Union (EU)
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regulations also belong to the Basque Country’s provinces, in that they are
in charge of their collection and obtain their revenue, though they can only
be regulated by the State. Such is the case with VAT, excise duties, and the
tax on the income of non-residents.
The structure and provisions of the Concierto or Convenio taxes do not
differ greatly from the State’s taxes. Nevertheless, some substantive
differences may be pointed out. For personal income tax, there are slightly
higher rates and greater progressiveness, as well as greater tax credits for
family circumstances. The tax rates are also lower for corporation income
tax (35 and 32.5 per cent, respectively), while the tax reliefs are higher.
Greater differences can be found in the death and gift taxes, where there are
substantially lower rates and a general exemption for close relatives. Since
the year 2000, there is a general tendency among the common-system ACs
to lower this tax, following the same pattern as the foral ACs. It would not
be surprising if this tax disappears, such as has happened in other
federations such as Canada (Boadway and Hobson, 1999: 48), as a
consequence of a generalized tendency to lower it (Ruiz Almendral: 2003a,
350ff). Finally, slightly lower tax rates have been established for the capital
transfers tax and stamp duty.
The Calculation of the Cupo
The Cupo is directed towards paying for the State’s general expenditures on
certain areas of national interest, such as foreign affairs, defence and the
army, customs and general transport. The method for calculating the Cupo
is regulated by the Economic Agreement Act and the Five-year Cupo Act
2002–06.19 
The amount of the Cupo (C) to be paid is determined by first
determining the fiscal capacity ratio or ‘attribution rate’ (i), calculated as the
percentage which the foral AC’s revenue bears to that of the State. This
percentage is then applied to total non-assumed charges for the foral AC. 
According to section 52 of the Economic Agreement Law, ‘to determine the
total amount of the said charges [non-assumed charges], the entire State
Budget allocation corresponding to the competences assumed by the AC …
shall be deducted from the total State Budget expenditures’.20
For the 2002–06 period, the attribution index has been established as
6.24 per cent. The resulting quantity (gross Cupo) must also undergo certain
adjustments, in order to take into account other variables. Thus, for example
the attributable portion of the deficit figuring in the general State budget is
subtracted from the Cupo. Other compensations include that which
corresponds to taxes not covered by the Economic Agreement. After such
adjustments and compensations, we obtain the final Cupo (net Cupo)21 – 
see Figure 1
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The Impact of EU Membership on the ACs’ Taxation Power
Belonging to the EU has had important consequences for the distribution of
authority in every member state with multiple levels of governments (Pérez
Tremps, 2000: 1079ff). Spain is no exception, and European integration
poses a very important limitation to the exercise of taxation powers by the
ACs. Obviously, such consequences are greater for the foral ACs, due to
their wider taxation powers. 
In this regard, there have been some conflicts when the EU has
questioned both the generally lower tax burden of the tax system in the
Basque Country and Navarra, in comparison to the common system, as well
as the very existence of such different tax regimes within the same country.
A good example of this is the European Commission Decision No.
93/337/CEE of 10 May 1993, which stated that some of the tax measures in
the Basque corporation income tax may be inconsistent with the right of
establishment (Section 43, EC Treaty) and may also fall under the category
of ‘state aids’ (Section 87, EC Treaty). Of special interest are the
conclusions of the Advocate-General, Antonio Saggio, presented on 1 July
1999 in the accumulated cases C-400/97, C-401/97 and C-402/97, also
relating to corporation income tax. 
In the few cases where the Constitutional Court has had to deal with the
Cupo system, it has clearly stated that it is consistent with the Constitution
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Calculation of Cupo (for base year 2002)
Attribution rate
6.24% ×
• Total State Budget expenditure
(   144,104,165.08)
minus
• Total State Budget allocation corresponding
to competences assumed by the AC
(   77,411,615.88)
Total non-assumed 
charges of the State
   66,692,549.20
GROSS
Cupo
   4,161,615.07=
NET
Cupo
   1,090,664.48
Adjustments and
Compensations
   3,070,950.59
– =
• For taxes not covered by the Economic
Agreement (  3,097,191.36 at 6.24 %)
=    193,264.74
• For other non tax income (   8,718,927,49 at
6.24 %) =    544,061.08
• For budget deficit (   32,916,367.94 at 6.24
%) =    2,053,981.36
• For direct taxes covered by the Economic
Agreement =    279,643.41
FIGURE 1
CALCULATION OF THE CUPO FOR THE BASQUE COUNTRY AC FOR BASE 
YEAR 2002 (THOUSAND OF EUROS)
Source:The author, with data provided by the Annex to the Five Year Quota Act, which can be
found in English at: http://www.euskadi.net/autogobierno/concierto_i.htm
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(inter alia, in Opinion 181/1988). However, a recent opinion of the same
court (96/2002) may have started a new line of thought that would clearly
limit the importance of the constitutional recognition of historic rights. This
opinion is very complicated, mainly because it does not state clearly, but
rather ‘suggests’, as obiter dicta, that a divergent tax system may not
comply with the principle of equality stated in Section 14 of the
Constitution. 
In this case, brought by the AC of La Rioja, which claimed the foral ACs
were engaging in fiscal competition, the Constitutional Court ruled that the
foral autonomy itself is not sufficient to render tax provisions admissible,
and that the equality rights are as much part of the Constitution as are the
special provisions that guarantee the historic rights. The relevance of this
opinion goes far beyond the actual decision taken22 because, for the first
time ever, the Court seems to call into question the existence of such
different systems. This decision has been the source of much controversy,
as indicated by the fact that it was rejected by half of the court’s judges and
could therefore only be approved because the president was in favour. It is
very likely that this opinion would not have been adopted had the European
Commission not questioned the foral systems previously. 
As for the common-system ACs, the main impact of the EU is that,
according to Section 19 of the LOFCA, the legislative powers over ceded
taxes may be revoked at any time by the State on the grounds of the
European harmonization process.
CONCLUSION
The decentralization process in Spain has been rapid and, generally
speaking, quite successful. Authority has been devolved to ACs in an orderly
fashion and this new tier of government has been well accepted by citizens. 
Nonetheless, some issues remain unresolved. Thus, while political
agreements are a necessary part of the cooperative federalism model of
Spain, the Senate should also play a role in the process. This will not be
possible unless there is a substantial reform of this institution. This reform
is now more necessary than ever, as only an adequate representative
chamber can guarantee that ACs will have a say in the EU policies that
affect them. Moreover, as important as the opinions of the Constitutional
Court may have been in the clarification of the devolution process, it is time
that most of the conflicts were discussed and resolved in Parliament, thus
decreasing what has been known as a judicialization of the State 
of Autonomies.
As for the level of fiscal responsibility, despite the important
reallocation of taxation powers that occurred in 1997 and 2002, there
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prevails a large imbalance between the authority exercised by the common-
system ACs and the foral ones. The fact that the Cupo system does not
envisage any guarantee of minimum revenues partially serves to explain
this situation.
NOTES
1. Of course, even the term ‘federation’ is not uncontroversial. While for some it is necessary
that the decentralization of powers derives directly from the constitution in order to
categorize a country as federal (Beer, 1997: 22), to others only those countries where sub-
national governments actually exercise their powers may fall into the said category (Bird,
1994: 295). It is so difficult to find two similar federations that the term must be used with
the utmost care (Watts, 1994).
2. Thus, under Section 148.2, slow-laners may take on competences, inter alia, on the
following areas of authority: forestry, cattle, fishing, housing, roads, non-commercial ports
and airports, environmental protection, libraries, museums, conservatoires, promotion of
tourism and sports. Fast-laners have access to all these, plus education and health.
3. In 2000, PP obtained absolute majority, which enabled it to govern without the need of CiU.
4. CiU’s support of the PSOE was the origin of the sharinge of a percentage of income tax for
some ACs (Agreement of 10 October 1993). CiU’s support for the PP was the origin of the
1997 reform (Agreement of 23 Sseptember 1996).
5. Such limitations are established in the laws regulating the Convenio and Concierto, and
basically refer to the need to maintain a certain level of harmonization with the State’s tax
system. They are, however, established in quite broad terms, which for example allow the
Basque Country to establish corporation tax credits that differ broadly from those of the
State.
6. The source for these data are: Órgano de Coordinación Tributaria de Euskadi (2002), p.81,
and Liquidación de Presupuestos de las Comunidades y Ciudades Autónomas (2003). These
can be found at www.estadief.minhac.es/ (accessed ???)
7. Source: Liquidación de Presupuestos de las Comunidades y Ciudades Autónomas (2003).
This can be found at: http://www.estadief.minhac.es/ (accessed ???)
8. Sentence Opinion 13/1992 contains a good summary of the Court’s case law in this matter.
As with the rest of the opinions, this can be found at www.tribunalconstitucional.es (accessed
???)
9. Recently, the State has passed a law to curb the deficit of ACs, and thus comply with
European Union requirements. This is the General Budget Stability Law (Ley 18/2001, 12
December, General de Estabilidad Presupuestaria) and it imposes new limits on the creation
of public debt by ACs. This law has been challenged before the Constitutional Court by the
PSOE, but it will be some time before a ruling is made.
10. Opinion 13/1992 contains a good summary of such measures.
11. In this respect, what happened when, in the early 1980s, the AC of Madrid decided to
establish a surtax of about 3 per cent on the State’s personal income tax is significant. Many
argued that such a surtax was unconstitutional and it was challenged before the
Constitutional Court. In Sentence Opinion 150/1990, it the Court declared it perfectly valid.
However, the law was that established it never implemented and was then repealed; the
PSOE Government that had established it lost the next elections in favour ofto the PP. 
12. Recently, Catalonia established a tax on big large commercial surfaces areas (Impuesto sobre
grandes establecimientos comerciales) by the Law 16/2000, of 29 December. No sooner had
the law been approved by Catalonia’s Parliament than it had beenwas challenged by the State
before the Constitutional Court, on the grounds that it is equivalent to some of the
Municipalities of the municipalities’ taxes (the property tax and the economic activities tax).
I have had the opportunity of to closely studying this tax closely and believe that it is not
similar to those cited taxes, as Catalonia’s tax is, mainly, a regulatory tax that, among other
objectives, aims to limit the establishment of large commercial areas in the cities, while the
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other two taxes serve completely different objectives. However, the opposite conclusion
must be drawn if we take into account the interpretation that theby the Constitutional Court
of such limits has given. In my opinion, this interpretation is, in many aspects, wrong and
seriously damages the financial autonomy of ACs.
13. The administration of ceded taxes by ACs is a major problem that has not, in my opinion,
received enough attention by politicians and scholars. As the excellent study of García
Martínez (2000) shows, this administration is, generally speaking, quite inefficient. This is
due to several reasons that the author thoroughly explains in this work and which can be
summarized into one: the amazing lack of cooperation between the ACs and the State in this
task. 
14. Law 21/2001, 27 December, por la que se regulan las medidas fiscales y administrativasdel
nuevo sistema de financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas de régimen común y
Ciudades con Estatuto de autonomía. (hereafter, the LSF)
15. By Section 50 of the Economic Agreement Law (Law 12/2002, 23 May, por la que se
aprueba el Concierto Económico con la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco).
16. Law 13/2002, 23 May, por la que se aprueba la metodología de señalamiento del cupo del
País Vasco para el quinquenio 2002–2006
17. Section 3 of the Economic Agreement Law.
18. Órgano de Coordinación Tributaria de Euskadi (2002), Informe Anual Integrado de la
Hacienda Vasca. (www.euskadi.net, accessed ???).
19. Full details of the Cupo formula can be found in the Five Year Cupo Act 2002–2006 (Law
13/2002, 23 May (sections 3 to 8). English versions of all the legal texts regarding the Basque
Country that are quoted in this article can be found at www.euskadi.net. 
20. Among others, the following are considered charges not assumed by the AC (section 52): (a)
The sums allocated in the General State Budget to the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund
referred to in section 158.2 of the Constitution (the contribution to this burden shall be made
by means of the procedure laid down in the Cupo Act); (b) Transfers or subsidies granted by
the State to public entities, provided that the competences exercised thereby have not been
assumed by the AC; (c) The interest payments and repayments of principle on all State debts
as determined in the Cupo Law.
21. The Cupo remains provisional until there is sufficient data to adjust it (i.e. final settlements
of the taxes, etc). Because the calculation is established for five years, the first (2002 in this
case) is used as the ‘base year’, which means all the calculations will be adjusted for the
subsequent years.
22. Which basically consisted of declaring void a State law that aimed to compensate European
non-residents for certain differences in their tax treatment in the foral and common ACs. 
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